Posted 12/10/13 by Common Good
Federal Rules at 75
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—the set of rules defining the process for civil lawsuits, now seventy-five years old—are outdated, inefficient, and expensive. You might not have guessed that, however, as present and former leaders of the rule-making process gathered recently for a symposium at the University of Pennsylvania to commemorate the 75th anniversary. If the symposium is any indication, urgently needed substantial reform of the federal rules is not in the cards.
The symposium’s prevailing narrative was that the Federal Rules have been a great success in adapting to new litigation challenges: lawmaking cases such as Brown v. Board of Education, private enforcement of public laws (so-called “private attorneys general”), mass tort litigation, and massive business-versus-business litigation (e.g., Apple v. Samsung). According to the narrative, the Rules were doing a pretty good job of adjudicating these claims until the late 1970s, when backlash arose against the huge costs of such litigation. Today, according to the narrative, the Supreme Court has reacted by limiting access to the federal courts (e.g., Rule 8 pleading, Rule 11 sanctions, Rule 23 class actions, Rule 26 discovery and Rule 56 summary judgment). The Court, so the narrative goes, has tilted in favor of business. “Plaintiphobia” rules.
Only a few voices spoke contrary to the prevailing narrative and suggested that the Federal Rules may have problems. Professor Harold Koh, formerly Dean of Yale Law School and Legal Advisor to the Department of State, asked provocatively whether the Rules have achieved their stated goal of “The Just, Speedy and Inexpensive Determination of Every Action”. He answered, “at best partially.” Professor Arthur Miller of NYU, one of the harshest critics of Supreme Court decisions limiting court access, gave them a less than stellar grade: “at best, B minus, and on an inflated grade curve, below the median.” He decried reforms of recent years as mostly “tinkering.”
There was one common theme of dissatisfaction: cases are no longer decided. Trials, and with them juries, have vanished. Only one percent of cases get trials. Judges are not judges of disputes, but “terminators” of case files—a point helpfully illustrated by a slide image of Arnold Schwarzenegger.
The flawed, prevailing narrative nevertheless remained: the Federal Rules must be preserved as they are (largely as they were in the 1970s) for these new forms of litigation, even if that means accepting unjust, expensive and slow resolution of disputes. In truth, new forms of litigation require new rules.
Several presenters came close to saying that the “transsubstantive” model, i.e., the same rules for all cases, is no longer valid. They suggested that the Federal Rules should have different litigation tracks for different sorts of claims. Under this approach, the process of discovery and judicial supervision might vary among different types of cases. Just maybe, such simpler procedures would bring needed common sense to federal dispute resolution.